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Abstract. Key management is the most complex part of any security 
system dealing with encryption of data. Using cloud computing reduces not 
only pressure on IT cost but it provides satisfactory performance. However, a 
very fundamental issue on cloud computing is the loss of hands-on control of 
system, application, and data security. In viewing of current cloud-computing 
environment, there is an issue of a comprehensive key management scheme. 
This paper analyzes the special security requirements of key management 
under the cloud-computing environment. The study involves analyzing a 
cloud-computing key management framework based on the XML key 
management specification and designs the cloud-computing key management 
framework and module function for MyGRANTs. XML key management 
specification establishes an abstraction layer between the application program 
and PKI, which solves the interoperability problem between different PKI 
systems. As a result, the improved interoperabilty of cloud computing key 
management with three working modules based on different trust relationship 
for MyGRANTs is outlined. 
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1   Introduction 
Cloud computing links a large number of computing resources, storage resources 
and software resources together, forming a virtual IT resource sharing pool at a 
large scale to provide IT services for the remote computer users which seems to 
possess an infinite power at users’ disposal [1]. However, cloud computing has 
become critical implementation dark due to security and privacy considerations [2]. 
It features a super-large scale, virtualization and generality and so on, meanwhile 
also brings a tremendous impact and challenges for the realization of user 
information security and privacy protection. Cryptography is one of effective 
methods to solve the security problems, while key management is its core problem, 
so the key management has become an important technology to insure the cloud-
computing security. 
Public key infrastructure (PKI) is one of the main methods of traditional public 
key management, whose core is composed of certificate authority (CA), by issuing a 
public key certificate for the user's public key to guarantee its authenticity and 
validity in the system. Public key certificate works out the issue of the authenticity 
and effectiveness of the public key, allowing PKI to provide a good security service 
for Internet users. But for cloud computing, PKI cannot be directly deployed 
because of two reasons: a) cloud computing covers a wide range, and has a large 
number of users, which result in the requirement of a unified, standard key 
management service, while PKI has a poor interoperability because of  the 
technical standard differences in various countries and regions and the differences 
existing in the data formats and the transport protocols; b) it is required to install a 
complex toolkit in the client side where all operations will be performed, which will 
cost a huge amount of resources and have a difficult deployment and appliance, so 
the efficiency of the cloud-computing server will seriously be affected. 
XKMS (XML key management specification,) establishes an abstraction layer 
between the application program and PKI, which blocks the underlying technologies 
of PKI, to allow the user to make use of the different PKI solutions, which solves 
the interoperability problem between different PKI systems. The literature [3] 
discusses the security problems of XKMS and puts forward by adding a sequence 
number in each message to prevent replay attacks. The literature [4] proposes two 
methods to ensure the security of XKMS message transmission: a) introducing the 
security service provided by boundary transmission protocol; b) introducing a 
transport layer protocol without security features. The literature [5] compares the 
protections for the denial of service attack from the two phase protocols, and puts 
forward to achieve the authentication of the client and the trust service respectively 
by the signature of message, identification code, revoke code and restoring the 
authorization code. The literature [6] gives the analysis on the XKMS security 
channel problems, and puts forward three approaches to establish a secure channel 
mode, namely, XML signature, transport layer security (such as SSL, TLS etc.) and 
network layer security (such as IPSec). However, the XKMS has not been studied 
under the cloud-computing environment. Through a research on the characteristics 
of the cloud-computing environment, this paper, based on improved XKMS, 
establishes a four-layer cloud-computing key management framework, designs the 
module of each part, presents a working mode based on the trust domain and finally 
analyzes the requirements to meet the cloud-computing key management needs. 
2  Cloud-Computing Key Management Framework 
2.1 The Characteristics of the Cloud-Computing Key Management 
Virtualization is one of the key technologies of cloud computing, which allows 
running multiple virtual machines simultaneously on the same physical server. 
Because of the different needs of each user, the cloud-computing has the following 
characteristics: a) there are different operating systems in the virtual machines; b) a 
virtual machine may possess several identities, and each identity has a different 
security level; c) different services as well as customized service have different 
qualities. At the same time, cloud computing also features a rapid deployment and 
dynamic migration. 
These characteristics of cloud computing different from those ordinary networks 
also impose some higher requirements on the key management: a) cloud providers 
need to provide key management client sides suitable to different operating systems 
and different key management technology standards and able to install and configure 
quickly. B) The security and usability of key in the process and after the completion 
of the virtual machine migration should be ensured. C) The key control among 
different levels should be more complex. 
2.2 General of XKMS 
The XKMS protocol is composed of two parts, namely XML key information 
service specification (XKISS) and XML key registration service specification (X-
KRSS). Both X-KISS and XKRSS are defined according to the structured language of 
XML Schema, running the message-based communication based on the simple object 
access protocol (SOAP), and the services they provide and the syntax definition of 
messages both are abiding by the Web service definition language (WSDL) [7]. X-
KISS defines the key information service specifications and provides key information 
services to key users, a kind service any client-side entity can use. XKISS offers two 
kinds of services, the query one and the verification one. X-KRSS defines the key 
management service specifications and provides key management services to key 
administrators, but each client-side entity has to go through the trust service 
authentication prior to utilizing such service. XKRSS provides registration service, 
redistribution service, undo service and recovery service. 
2.3 Cloud-Computing Key Management Framework 
Because cloud computing is the fusion and development of distributed computing, 
Internet technologies, large-scale resource management and other technologies, its 
key security is subjected to a higher requirement and a more difficult management. 
The literature [8] holds that the problems and challenges the cloud-computing key 
management is facing include the storage of the safe key, key access, key backup and 
recovery. It suggests separating the key management from the cloud service 
providers, which can exempt the cloud service provider and cloud users from conflicts 
when a need authorized by law occurs to provide data. The cloud-computing key 
management framework proposed in literature [9][10] consists of the cloud-
computing key client side and cloud-computing key management server, providing 
the comprehensive and effective cloud-computing key management services based on 
the unified management framework and mechanism. 
At present, the cloud-computing, in the way of computing center, spreads all over 
the world, yet the existing PKI obviously has the regional and industry characteristics, 
so the cloud-computing can capitalize on the existing PKI providers to provide the 
key management services. 
Currently, the cloud-computing, in the way of computing center, spreads all over 
the world, yet the existing PKI obviously has the regional and industry characteristics. 
Therefore, the cloud-computing can capitalize on the existing PKI providers to 
provide the key management services. According to the cloud-computing deployment 
model, this paper designs a four-layer cloud-computing key management framework, 
namely, key management client, trust service, key management service center and 
PKI providers, in Fig 1. This framework covers four management levels, ranging 
from the small to the large, including virtual machine, cloud-computing physical 
server, cloud-computing center and the whole cloud. 
 
 
Fig 1. Cloud computing key management framework 
3 Module Design 
The cloud-computing key management framework has been discussed above, and 
next we will take about the module components of each part. a) Key management 
client side is deployed in the cloud user’s virtual machine, responsible for delivering 
the trust services required by user’s application programs in the SOAP message 
format to the trust server, receiving and analyzing the response messages from the 
trust server, and offering the response to the request message to the application 
program. It includes client application interface, message structure/analysis module, 
encryption / decryption algorithm module, XML signature module, trusted attestation 
module and trust services interface, as shown in Fig 2. Trust server side deployed in 
the cloud-computing application server, is an independent virtual domain in charge of 
receiving the client's request and reply, and communicating with the key management 
center. Trust service embodies an idea "transforming software into service", as the 
agent of the PKI provider, it undertakes many key/certificate operations originally 
completed by the PKI users, such as, certificate analysis, LDAP directory access, 
CRL and so on. Cloud users no longer need to install and run the complicated PKI 
client software, but only need to use the single client-side software before enjoying 
the service mode to obtain the information of key/certificate. Trust server side 
includes the client-side interface, message parsing/structure module, certificate 
authentication module, XML signature module and key management center interface, 
as shown in Fig 3. Key management center in the logical boundary of cloud is a 
management center linking the cloud-computing and the external PKI, responsible for 
the integration, scheduling and then transmitting to the PKI of the key management 
request in the in cloud computing. It includes trust service interface, message 
structure / analysis module, task scheduling module, trusted attestation module and 
PKI interface, as shown in Fig 4. 
 
 
Fig 2. Key management client 
 
 
Fig 3. Key management trusted service 
 
 
Fig 4. Cloud key management center 
3.1 Cloud-Computing Key Management Scheme  
System initialization: System initialization covers user side, server side, key 
management center and the confirmation of the PKI key parameters.  The registration 
of user key: After receiving the login request from the user side, the trust server will 
analyze the message and verify it by a digital signature, then to submit to the key 
management center; the key management center will request the distribution to the 
corresponding underlying PKI, finally, which will release a digital certificate to the 
user. And the trust server will save user’s digital certificate in the local certificate 
repository for later query.  Key query: User side will send the 'ds: KeyInfo' elements 
request to the trust server which will send back the 'ds: KeyInfo' elements covering 
public key to meet the client’s demand according to whether the queried key exists 
the trust server or not: trust service can analyze the 'ds: KeyInfo' elements locally, or 
also can transfer the client request to other PKI servers.  Key migration: With the 
migration of the user’s virtual machine, the user’s key will also be on its’ heel. Key 
management center notifies the trust service A in the place where the virtual machine 
was of migrating to the trust service B in the place where the virtual machine is. 
Firstly, trust services A and B will have a identity authentication and trusted 
attestation; and then trust service A will go through a key encryption for the user key 
making use of the public key of the trust service B, and transmit the encrypted key to 
B. after receiving it B will decrypt the encrypted key by its private key, then the key 
migration finishes its course. Thus, the transmission of the user’s key between trust 
services can avoid the bottleneck problems generated by the key migration between 
the key management centers. 
4 Conclusion 
In view of the present cloud-computing still short of a complete and unified key 
management scheme, this paper puts forward the four-layer cloud-computing key 
management framework based on the XKMS. Including trust service client side, trust 
server, key management service center and PKI provider, the framework, taking the 
traditional PKI as the underlying server of the cloud-computing key management 
service and capitalizing on the abstraction layer between the PKI and the XKMS as an 
application program, shields the difference of PKI’s underlying technology, and 
improves the interoperability of the cloud-computing key management. Aiming at the 
framework, this paper also designed the module function of each part, and conceives 
three working modes based on different trust relationship.  
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